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Abstract 
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have led to 
an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries, but its consequences for subjective 
well-being are largely unknown.  
Financial consequences of retirement complicate the estimation of effects of retirement on 
subjective well-being as financial circumstances may influence subjective well-being, and 
therefore, the effects of retirement are likely to be confounded by the change in income. At the 
same time, unobservable determinants of income are probably related with unobservable 
determinants of subjective wellbeing, making income possibly endogenous if used as control in 
subjective wellbeing regressions. To address these issues, we estimate a simultaneous model of 
retirement, income, and subjective well-being while accounting for time effects and unobserved 
individual effects. Public pension arrangements (replacement rates, eligibility rules for early and 
full retirement) serve as instrumental variables. We use data from HRS and SHARE for the 
period 2004-2010.  
We find that depressive symptoms are negatively related to retirement while life satisfaction is 
positively related. Remarkably, income does not seem to have a significant effect on depression 
or life satisfaction. This is in contrast with the correlations in the raw data that show significant 
relations between income and depression and life satisfaction. This suggests that accounting for 
the endogeneity of income in equations explaining depression or life satisfaction is important. 
Citation 
Fonseca, Raquel, Arie Kapteyn, Jinkook Lee, and Gema Zamarro. 2014. “Does Retirement Make 
you Happy? A Simultaneous Equations Approach.” University of Michigan Retirement Research 
Center (MRRC) Working Paper, WP 2014-310. Ann Arbor, MI. 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp310.pdf 
Authors’ Acknowledgements 
The research reported herein was pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA), funded as part of the Michigan Retirement Research Consortium (RRC). 
The findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the 
views of SSA, or any agency of the federal government. The authors also acknowledge support 
by the National Institute on Aging under grant 2P01AG022481 and 2R01 AG030153. This 
research is also part of the program of the Industrial Alliance Research Chair on the Economics 
of Demographic Change. 
1. Introduction
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have 
led to an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries, but its consequences for 
subjective well-being are largely unknown.1 As subjective well-being is known to influence 
health, if retirement has adverse effects on subjective well-being, it is plausible that the fiscal 
savings created by delaying retirement may be at least partly offset by increased health 
expenditures driven by worsened subjective well-being.  
1 An exception is Grip et al. (2012) who found a strong and persistent negative effect on psychological well-being 
from a change in the Dutch civil servants’ pension system that affected the pension age eligibility of some cohorts 
but not of others.   
Labor force participation may affect subjective well-being in a number of different ways. 
Specifically, there is solid evidence that unemployment can adversely affect subjective well-
being (i.e., Lucas et al. (2004), Clark and Oswald (1994) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
(1998)), but some mixed evidence on how retirement might do so.2  In the U.S. evidence is 
mixed, finding both positive (Charles, 2004) and negative (Dave, Rashad, & Spasojevic, 2008; 
Szinovacz & Davey, 2004) retirement effects.  In contrast, consistently positive effects are found 
in England (Johnston & Lee, 2009; Mein et al., 2004) and Finland (Okasanen et al., 2011; 
Salokangas & Joukamaa, 1991), while no effect is found in the Republic of Korea or continental 
Europe for depression measures (Lee & Smith, 2009; Coe & Zamarro, 2011), suggesting 
potential cross-country variations in retirement effects on subjective well-being.3  
2 The same mixed results are found in the psychology literature where the debate on how the retirement affects the 
wellbeing started a bit earlier than in economics research (see Pinquart and Schindle (2007) and their citations) 
3  Several of these studies have tried to circumvent endogeneity problems by using an instrumental variables 
approach.  For example, Charles (2004), Johnson and Lee (2009), and Coe and Zamarro (2011) used pension 
entitlement age as an instrument; Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic (2008) used spouse’s retirement status; and Lee and 
Smith (2009) used mandatory retirement policy as instruments. However, up to this point there is no cross-country 
Two other branches of the literature relate retirement and well-being. Recently a number of 
papers have found that retirement could have positive or negative effects on wellbeing depending 
on how the transition to retirement happens. For example, Clark and Fawaz (2009) using 
European and British data sets find that the type of job in which retirees were employed before 
retirement affects wellbeing after retirement. Similarly, Calvo and al. (2007) and Bonsang and 
Klein (2011) find that wellbeing is affected by whether the individual perceives the transition to 
retirement as voluntary or not. A different literature relates well-being and aging. Several papers 
find a U-shaped relationship between life satisfaction and age (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 
(2008), De Ree, J. and R. Alessie (2011) and van Landeghem (2012) among others). Although 
De Ree and Alessie (2011) note that age effects cannot be identified without imposing cohort 
effect assumptions. 
In Fonseca et al. (2014), we examined the effect of retirement on subjective well-being 
within 12 countries, using panel data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 
Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). In estimating retirement effects, 
we accounted for potential reverse causation of poor subjective well-being on retirement, using 
an instrumental variables approach by exploiting variations in public pension eligibility due to 
country and cohort specific retirement ages (early and full entitlement ages).  Here, we provide a 
more comprehensive analysis of the interplay of work/retirement, financial well-being, and 
subjective well-being.  
Financial consequences of retirement complicate the estimation of effects of retirement 
on subjective well-being as financial circumstances, both in absolute and relative terms (i.e. 
one’s financial means in comparison with others), may influence subjective well-being, and 
therefore, the effect of retirement is likely to be confounded by the change in income. At the 
same time, unobservable determinants of income are probably related with unobservable 
comparative study of the effect of retirement on an array of well-being measures, while addressing the potential 
endogeneity of retirement choices. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
determinants of subjective wellbeing, making income possibly endogenous if used as control in 
subjective wellbeing regressions. To address these issues, we estimate a simultaneous model, 
explicitly modeling the interplay of retirement, income, and subjective well-being while still 
using our instrumental variables approach for retirement decisions based on public pension 
eligibility. By estimating the complete system of equations we are able to get a better 
understanding of the role of retirement induced through Social Security or pension eligibility in 
determining the subjective as well as financial well-being of the elderly.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the data are described, 
while in Section 3 we describe the model we are estimating. Section 4 presents and discusses 
estimation results. To gain further insights in the nature of the estimated relationships we present 
some simulations in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data 
This paper makes use of data from HRS and SHARE for a common period of observation 
(2004-2010).  For HRS there are currently eleven waves of data (1992 – 2012) available. The 
HRS was designed to cover a wide range of demographics, health, work and retirement, income 
and assets, as well as family and social networks. SHARE was developed using the HRS model 
to collect conceptually comparable data across different countries in these key domains. Lee 
(2007) provides a detailed discussion of the comparability of the surveys. Currently, three waves 
of SHARE (2004, 2006 and 2010) are available. The first wave of SHARE was collected in 2004 
in eleven European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden). The 2008 SHARE wave was devoted to life-
history interviews and did not include subjective well-being measures.  
All surveys contain several questions that can be used as indicators of subjective and 
financial well-being. Table 1 summarizes the available information and comparability of 
subjective wellbeing questions. Although not all surveys include exactly identical questions on 
subjective wellbeing, they all include questions that cover comparable domains and harmonized 
versions of variables can be constructed for cross-country comparison. Comparable measures of 
 ).  
total household income can also be constructed. In this respect, the project benefits from ongoing 
efforts to harmonize aging datasets around the world (
Table 1: Data on Subjective Well-being  in HRS and SHARE 
HRS SHARE 
Well-Being 
Measure 
Life satisfaction 
Diener scale (2004-2010 Leave Behind 
Questionnaire, LBQ); a single-item overall 
life satisfaction (2008-2010 Core 
interview) 
A single-item overall life 
satisfaction question (2006-
2010 Core Interview) 
Depressive 
symptoms 8 items CESD (1994-2010 Core interview) 
12 items EURO-D (2004-2010 
Core); 8-item CESD questions 
to a random sub-sample (2006 
Core) 
The single-item overall life satisfaction question in SHARE reads as follows: 
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely 
satisfied, how satisfied are you with your life? 
0..10 
As noted in Table 1, this question is only available in two waves: 2006 and 2010. The single-
item life satisfaction question included in HRS waves 2008 and 2010 reads: 
Please think about your life-as-a-whole. How satisfied are you with it? 
Are you completely satisfied, very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied?  
1. Completely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Not very satisfied
5. Not at all satisfied
8. Don't know; not ascertained
9. Refused
Although the formulation of the life satisfaction questions in HRS and SHARE is similar, 
the response scales are not. We have first reverse coded the HRS scale so that it runs from “Not 
at all satisfied” to “Completely Satisfied”. Next we have recoded the SHARE responses as 
follows: 0, 1, 2 are recoded as 1; 3, 4 are recoded as 2; 5, 6 are recoded as 3; 7, 8 are recoded as 
http://www.g2aging.org/
 4; 9,10 are recoded as 5. After recoding we obtain the following distribution of self-reported life 
satisfaction by country: 
Table 2:  Distribution of Life Satisfaction by Country (%) 
Life Satisfaction 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Country
Austria 1.3 3.3 15.0 42.3 38.2 100 
Belgium 0.4 1.4 10.7 61.0 26.5 100 
Denmark 0.3 0.6 6.0 37.0 56.2 100 
France 1.3 2.7 20.1 54.6 21.4 100 
Germany 0.8 2.6 16.4 47.8 32.5 100 
Greece 1.0 2.6 25.3 56.7 14.4 100 
Italy 1.9 2.9 18.2 52.0 25.0 100 
Netherlands 0.2 0.5 4.6 68.2 26.6 100 
Spain 1.5 4.2 18.2 48.4 27.7 100 
Sweden 0.5 0.9 7.4 42.3 49.0 100 
Switzerland 0.1 1.1 7.2 41.2 50.4 100 
United States 0.9 3.1 24.4 46.4 25.3 100 
Total 0.8 2.4 17.6 49.2 29.9 100 
The HRS has included an 8-item binary version of CESD (yes/no/DK/RF) in core 
interviews during 1994 – 2010.  This 8-item measure with binary response categories constitutes 
a sub-set of the original 20-item CESD scale which uses a 4-point Likert-scale.  Based on the 
advice of mental health practitioners who compared this modified version of the CESD scale 
with structured interviews evaluating major depression, a cutoff threshold of 3 (out of 8) is often 
taken as a clinically important level of psychological distress. Thus, based on this clinical 
threshold, we created a binary variable of depression.  Similarly, for SHARE, we created a 
binary variable based on the recommended clinical threshold for the Euro-D.  Table 3 presents 
the prevalence of depression according to the constructed binary measures in the various 
countries in our sample. 
We note that depression is substantially less prevalent in the U.S. than in the European 
countries, according to this measure. This suggests that the depression measures might not be 
strictly comparable. In the analyses that follow we will always include country dummies that 
hopefully will correct for the lack of comparability. 
Table 3:  Depression by Country 
 Depressed  
No Yes Total Country 
Austria 81.1 18.9 100 
Belgium 75.8 24.3 100 
Denmark 84.8 15.2 100 
France 68.4 31.6 100 
Germany 81.3 18.7 100 
Greece 81.5 18.5 100 
Italy 69.3 30.7 100 
Netherlands 83.0 17.0 100 
Spain 68.1 31.9 100 
Sweden 82.5 17.5 100 
Switzerland 83.7 16.3 100 
United States 87.4 12.6 100 
Total 82.3 17.7 100 
 
The key outcome variables considered in this paper are retirement status, household 
income, depression, and life satisfaction. Table 4 presents the correlations between these four 
variables by country. Although the correlations are often not very large in absolute value, the 
signs of the correlations are identical across all countries, with the exception of the correlation 
between retirement and life satisfaction in the U.S., which is slightly positive, whereas in other 
countries it is negative. We see positive correlations between retirement and depression and 
between log-income and life satisfaction; we observe negative correlations between retirement 
and log-income; retirement and life satisfaction; log-income and life satisfaction; depression and 
life satisfaction. 
 
  
Table 4: Correlations Between Key Outcome Variables
  
Retirement, 
Log-income 
Retirement, 
Depression 
Retirement, 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Log-
income, 
Depression 
Log-
income, 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Depression, 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Austria -0.13 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 0.14 -0.41 
Belgium -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 -0.28 
Denmark -0.32 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.29 
France -0.18 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 0.21 -0.30 
Germany -0.14 0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.21 -0.32 
Greece -0.28 0.15 -0.15 -0.09 0.22 -0.26 
Italy -0.14 0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.15 -0.35 
Netherlands -0.24 0.09 -0.04 -0.10 0.11 -0.26 
Spain -0.24 0.17 -0.07 -0.10 0.13 -0.38 
Sweden -0.22 0.08 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.28 
Switzerland -0.16 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.13 -0.31 
United 
States -0.35 0.08 0.02 -0.16 0.13 -0.34 
Total -0.28 0.10 -0.03 -0.15 0.18 -0.31 
 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics by country. We observe substantial differences in 
retirement rates across countries, with Italy and Austria having the highest retirement rates and 
the U.S., Switzerland, and Denmark the lowest. Log-income and log-wealth vary substantially 
across countries. To the extent that this reflects exchange rate effects these will be absorbed by 
additive country dummies in our model. Probably the most striking difference across countries is 
the high prevalence of major health conditions in the U.S. in comparison to the European 
countries, while also the number of ADLs is larger in the U.S. than in Europe. This may be partly 
explained by the somewhat higher ages of respondents in the HRS sample.  
 Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Retired Age Female 
Log-
Household 
income 
Log- 
Household 
Wealth 
At least 
one ADL 
Major 
Health 
Condition 
Less than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College Country 
Austria 0.82 66.1 0.56 10.08 11.08 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.61 0.21 
Belgium 0.72 65.3 0.51 10.16 12.10 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.25 
Denmark 0.59 64.9 0.54 11.78 13.43 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.49 0.37 
France 0.70 65.4 0.55 10.23 12.03 0.09 0.20 0.39 0.40 0.21 
Germany 0.67 64.9 0.52 10.20 11.35 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.71 0.28 
Greece 0.66 63.9 0.47 9.62 11.66 0.06 0.16 0.48 0.35 0.17 
Italy 0.80 65.8 0.49 9.85 11.94 0.08 0.16 0.52 0.41 0.07 
Netherlands 0.68 64.3 0.52 10.33 11.51 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.63 0.23 
Spain 0.75 66.8 0.49 9.54 11.94 0.10 0.16 0.64 0.28 0.08 
Sweden 0.63 66.6 0.53 11.97 13.48 0.06 0.21 0.34 0.43 0.23 
Switzerland 0.59 65.5 0.54 11.07 12.64 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.73 0.10 
United 
States 0.62 68.5 0.56 10.62 12.02 0.15 0.43 0.23 0.54 0.23 
Total 0.65 66.9 0.54 10.54 12.07 0.11 0.30 0.26 0.52 0.22 
 
In the analysis we will use several institutional parameters that vary across countries. 
Table 6 shows replacement rates at full retirement age in the various countries.  The replacement 
rates are net of taxes for a median earner with an uninterrupted career. Obviously individual 
replacement rates may vary substantially, but for the purpose of international comparison this 
information is probably about as good as it gets.  
  
Table 6: Replacement Rates at Full Retirement Age 
Male_2004 Female_2004 Male_2006 Female_2006 Male_2010 Female_2010 Country 
Austria 93.2 84.6 90.3 90.3 89.9 89.9 
Belgium 63.1 63.1 63.7 63.7 63.8 63.8 
Denmark 54.1 54.1 91.3 91.3 86.9 86.9 
France 68.8 68.8 65.7 65.7 60.7 60.7 
Germany 71.8 71.8 61.3 61.3 58.5 58.5 
Greece 99.9 99.9 110.8 110.8 70.7 70.7 
Italy 88.8 88.8 74.8 58.1 92.4 92.4 
Netherlands 84.1 84.1 103.2 103.2 100.7 100.7 
Spain 88.3 88.3 84.7 84.7 80.1 80.1 
Sweden 68.2 68.2 64.1 64.1 53.6 53.6 
Switzerland 67.3 68.0 64.5 65.3 65.4 64.4 
United 
States 51 51 44.8 44.8 48.5 48.5 
Sources: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ELSPENSIONS# ; Pensions at a Glance, 2005. 
The replacement rates are net replacement rates (after tax) at the nations’ full retirement age for a median 
earner who entered the labor force at the age of 20 and experienced an uninterrupted career.  
Another important institutional variable is the age at which one may be eligible for early 
or full retirement. Both full and early retirement ages are given in Table 7. The ages for the U.S, 
refer to Social Security claiming ages, rather than retirement; 62 is the earliest age at which one 
can claim Social Security. One can claim Social Security at any time between 62 and seventy 
and a half, with an actuarial adjustment for claiming earlier or later than the full retirement age.  
Receipt of Social Security benefits has no implications for one’s ability to be gainfully 
employed. For comparison purposes we treat the U.S. early claiming age and full retirement age 
similarly to the treatment of early and full retirement ages in the European countries. 
  
Table 7: Early and Full Retirement Ages (full retirement ages in parentheses) 
  2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Country 
Austria 60 (65) 57 (60) 65 (65) 60 (60) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 62(65) 60(65) 
Belgium 60(65) 60 (65) 60(65) 60 (65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 
Denmark 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 67(67) 67(67) 
France 57 (60) 57(60) 60 (60) 60(60) 60 (60) 60 (60) 61(61) 61(61) 56-60(65) 56-60(65) 
Germany 63(65) 63(65) 63(65) 63(65) 63(65) 63(65) 63(67) 63(67) 63(67) 63(67) 
Greece 60(65) 55(60) 57(65) 57(65) 55(65) 55(65) 55(65) 55(65) 55(65) 55(65) 
Italy 57(65) 57(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(60) 60(65) 60(60) 61(65) 60(60) 
Netherlands 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 65(65) 65(65) 
Spain 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 60(65) 61(65) 61(65) 
Sweden 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 61(65) 
Switzerland 63(65) 62(64) 63(65) 62(64) 63(65) 62(64) 63(65) 62(64) 63(65) 62(64) 
United States* 
*Full retirement age depends on birth year 
62(65) 62(65) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 62(65+) 
Sources: OECD Pensions at a Glance several years. 
3. Model 
We consider a system of four equations. The first equation explains retirement; the 
second equation models log-income. The third and fourth equations explain depression and life 
satisfaction. The specifications are as follows:  
The Labor Supply Equation:      (1) 0 1 2
L
ict ict ict ci ictR X I eρ ρ ρ ρ= + + + +
The Income Equation:      (2) 1 2 3ln
Y
ict ict ict ct ci ictY X R Iγ γ γ γ ε= + + + +
The Subjective Well-being Equations: For both life satisfaction and depression, we will estimate 
linear models of the form:   (3) 1 2 3 4ln SWict ict ict ict ct ci ictSW Y X R Iα α α α α υ= + + + + +
Where  is the logarithm of current per capita household income of an individual i, who 
lives in country c, at time t,  denotes a given measure of subjective well-being (life 
Satisfaction or depression), and  takes the value one if the individual is retired at time t and 
zero otherwise.  is the set of individual and household explanatory variables and includes: 
gender, ethnicity, age, time effects, education, marital status, and health and disability measures. 
ictYln
ictSW
ictR
ictX
Y
ctI represents institutional variables that may affect the income process such as indices of 
welfare program generosity or average replacement rates in retirement and unemployment 
insurance programs. SWctI denotes institutional variables that may affect subjective well-being 
directly (e.g. social safety nets), as opposed to indirectly through income (ln )ictY . 
L
ictI  contains a 
set of indicator variables denoting retirement incentives. In order for these institutional variables 
to be validly excluded from (1) and (2) they must not have a direct effect on well-being. Their 
effect on well-being is only through the influence on retirement. In particular, we will use 
dummy variables indicating whether or not an individual is above the full or early retirement 
age: 1( _ _ )Lict it ctI age Statutory retirement age= ≥ .  The inclusion of individual specific constant 
terms ( ciρ  , ciγ  and ciα ) is important because it allows us to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity, as well as for time-invariant measurement error in reporting household income or 
wellbeing.  
Ideally, one would want to estimate dynamic versions of equations (1)-(3).  Given that we 
have only two waves of the life satisfaction variable in either survey, estimation of a dynamic 
panel data model with individual effects is out of the question. For depression, SHARE has three 
waves of data (and HRS has more) so a dynamic model can be estimated in principle, but 
identification would be tenuous. We limit ourselves therefore to static models until the 2012 
wave of SHARE becomes available. 
A Hausman specification test soundly rejects the random effects assumption of 
independence of the individual effects of the other right hand side variables in (1)-(3). So we 
adhere to a fixed effects assumption, which allows the individual effects to correlate with the 
explanatory variables in the equations.  A straight fixed effects estimation procedure would wipe 
out all non-time varying variables, such country dummies. Due to a result by Mundlak (1978), 
the estimated coefficients of the time varying explanatory variables are identical to what would 
be obtained in a random effects specification, while including the individual means of all time 
varying explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equations. It is easy to see that this 
also holds if one includes the non-time varying explanatory variables on the right hand side. The 
advantage of this procedure is that one then also obtains estimates of the effects of the non-time 
varying variables, such as country dummies, education, and gender. 
Several of the right hand side variables may not be strictly comparable due to institutional 
differences, such as education. The same might be true for other variables, such as ADLs and 
major health conditions, as noted above. We therefore include several interactions of such 
variables with a dummy for the US. So the assumption is that these variables are reasonably 
comparable across European countries, but less so between the US and Europe. We could of 
course include full interactions of such variables with all country dummies, but we abstain from 
that, mainly for reasons of parsimony. 
4. Results 
The system is estimated with 2SLS, taking into account random individual effects in a Mundlak 
–type specification (xtivreg in STATA). Table 8 contains the estimation results. Before 
discussing the estimates, it is worth noting the exclusion restrictions that were imposed to 
identify the model. The first equation (the retirement equation) is a reduced form equation and 
hence no exclusion restrictions are needed.  The equation for the logarithm of per capita 
household income has two endogenous explanatory variables on the right hand side: retirement 
status (retired or not) and an interaction between being retired and the pension replacement rate. 
These two variables are instrumented by all exogenous variables in the model. The excluded 
variables are whether one is above full or early retirement age and an interaction of these 
variables with the pension replacement rate. So the assumption is that these variables do not 
exert a direct effect on household income, but only via the retirement variables. 
The equations for being depressed (a binary variable, cf. Table 3) and life satisfaction (a 
variable taking on 5 possible values, cf. Table 2) have identical structures. Two explanatory 
variables are endogenous: retirement status and the logarithm of per capita household income. 
The exclusion restrictions are the same as for the log-household income equation.  
As noted, we estimate a Mundlak specification, so that we also have estimated 
coefficients for the individual means of all time varying variables. For brevity’s sake these 
coefficients are not reported. 
The estimated effects of individual and institutional variables on retirement are largely 
according to expectation (first column of Table 8). The probability of being retired decreases 
with education, but increases with age for most of the relevant age range (the quadratic age  
Table 8: Estimation Results 
Retired Log HH-Income Depressed Life Satisfaction VARIABLES 
Retired   -0.978*** 
(0.067) 
-0.061* 
(0.032) 
0.179** 
(0.086) 
Pension rr*(Retired)   
  
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
  
  
  
  
Unemployed   
  
-0.881*** 
(0.210) 
0.106 
(0.105) 
-0.596* 
(0.305) 
Unemployed*unempl. rr   
  
1.073*** 
(0.350) 
-0.167 
(0.175) 
0.893* 
(0.511) 
Log-household net wealth   
  
0.151*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
d2006 0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.198*** 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.149*** 
(0.040) 
d2008 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.349*** 
(0.025) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.034 
(0.023) 
d2010 0.072*** 
(0.016) 
0.420*** 
(0.039) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
  
  
Age 0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.154*** 
(0.010) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.064*** 
(0.017) 
Age^2 divided by 100 -0.032*** 
(0.002) 
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
Female 0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.158*** 
(0.010) 
0.083*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
Married 0.014 
(0.010) 
0.257*** 
(0.024) 
-0.081*** 
(0.013) 
0.258*** 
(0.039) 
Married and Female 0.011 
(0.013) 
0.182*** 
(0.030) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.078 
(0.050) 
College -0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.363*** 
(0.012) 
-0.088*** 
(0.010) 
0.205*** 
(0.023) 
College in US -0.012 
(0.008) 
0.292*** 
(0.016) 
-0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-0.109*** 
(0.027) 
High School -0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.147*** 
(0.008) 
-0.056*** 
(0.005) 
0.135*** 
(0.013) 
High School in US -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
0.130*** 
(0.013) 
-0.022*** 
(0.008) 
-0.110*** 
(0.020) 
ADL -0.142*** 
(0.011) 
0.291*** 
(0.024) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
0.115*** 
(0.042) 
ADL in US 0.175*** 
(0.010) 
-0.249*** 
(0.021) 
0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.225*** 
(0.036) 
Major health condition 0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
0.079*** 
(0.007) 
-0.071*** 
(0.020) 
Major health condition in US 0.040*** 
(0.008) 
0.207*** 
(0.020) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
-0.058* 
(0.033) 
Austria 0.185*** -0.547*** 0.091*** 0.086* 
  (0.013) (0.030) (0.016) (0.048) 
Belgium 0.204*** 
(0.010) 
-0.519*** 
(0.024) 
0.160*** 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.045) 
Denmark 0.099*** 
(0.011) 
0.864*** 
(0.023) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
0.531*** 
(0.053) 
France 0.126*** 
(0.010) 
-0.387*** 
(0.022) 
0.207*** 
(0.014) 
-0.141*** 
(0.041) 
Germany 0.151*** 
(0.011) 
-0.463*** 
(0.023) 
0.097*** 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.044) 
Greece 0.107*** 
(0.012) 
-1.264*** 
(0.028) 
0.137*** 
(0.023) 
-0.297*** 
(0.065) 
Italy 0.169*** 
(0.011) 
-0.840*** 
(0.025) 
0.234*** 
(0.019) 
-0.198*** 
(0.053) 
Netherlands 0.181*** 
(0.011) 
-0.490*** 
(0.026) 
0.079*** 
(0.014) 
0.122*** 
(0.041) 
Spain 0.134*** 
(0.011) 
-1.124*** 
(0.025) 
0.252*** 
(0.023) 
-0.197*** 
(0.062) 
Sweden 0.058*** 
(0.010)
1.135*** 
(0.020) 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
0.472*** 
(0.057) 
Switzerland 0.065*** 
(0.012) 
0.363*** 
(0.023) 
0.032** 
(0.015) 
0.393*** 
(0.038) 
Midwest 0.034 
(0.027) 
-0.057 
(0.064) 
0.000 
(0.033) 
0.105 
(0.115) 
South 0.049** 
(0.021) 
-0.065 
(0.050) 
-0.005 
(0.026) 
0.085 
(0.090) 
West -0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.177*** 
(0.060) 
0.032 
(0.031) 
0.123 
(0.098) 
Residing outside US 0.346*** 
(0.107) 
-0.008 
(0.256) 
0.102 
(0.150) 
-0.243 
(0.784) 
Above full ret age 0.103*** 
(0.014) 
      
Above early ret age 0.154*** 
(0.014) 
      
Pension rr*(above full ret. age) 0.000 
(0.000) 
      
Pension rr*(above early ret. age) -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
      
Log-household income     0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
Constant -3.726*** 
(0.101) 
10.777*** 
(0.354) 
-0.379 
(0.295) 
5.371*** 
(0.727) 
Observations 120,775 120,775 116,254 63,661 
Number of groups 52,028 52,028 51,006 40,429 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
relation has a maximum at 76 years). Females are more likely to be retired. Major health 
conditions have a negative effect on the probability of being in the labor force, particularly in the 
U.S. Note that for the interpretation of coefficients for the U.S. these have to be added to the 
overall coefficient. So for instance the coefficient of “Major health condition” in the retirement 
equation is 0.008, while the coefficient for “Major health condition in the US” is .040. This 
means that the effect of a major health condition in the US is equal to .008+.040=.048. 
Difficulties with activities of daily living reduce the chances of being in the labor force in the 
U.S., but not in Europe. Being eligible for early or full retirement has a strong positive effect on 
the probability of being retired. The pension replacement rates appear to have only a limited 
effect, possibly reflecting the fact that these may be poor proxies of the actual replacement rates 
faced by individuals. Their effects may also be absorbed by the country dummies. The country 
dummies generally suggest a higher retirement probability in the European countries than in the 
regions of the U.S. (The North East is the reference category). Residents outside the U.S. are 
more likely to be retired, presumably because many of these moved to a location outside the U.S. 
to spend their retirement years. The time dummies suggest an increase in retirement probability 
over time, which may reflect the effect of the evolving financial crisis. 
The income equation (second column in Table 8) shows a negative effect of retirement on 
income, which may be compensated by a high pension replacement rate. For instance if the 
pension-replacement rate is 100% (as it is in the Netherlands) then the net effect of retirement on 
income is quite modest. A similar observation can be made with respect to the effect of 
unemployment. Being unemployed reduces income very substantially, but this can be 
compensated for by a high income replacement rate. In this age range income is monotonically 
decreasing in age (the parabola has a minimum at 164). Since we control for individual effects, 
we are implicitly also controlling for cohort effects. The effects of health conditions are 
somewhat difficult to interpret. ADLs have a negative effect in the U.S., but not in Europe, while 
for the presence of a major health condition the pattern is reversed. Caution needs to be exercised 
when interpreting country dummies as these are affected by exchange rates (except for the 
comparison of countries within the euro zone: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain). 
For the purpose of this paper, the final two columns in Table 8 are of most interest. It 
appears that being retired both reduces the likelihood of depression (though only significantly so 
at the 10% level) and improves life satisfaction. This is in contrast with the findings in Table 4, 
where we found that in the raw data retirement was negatively related to life satisfaction in all 
countries (with the sole exception of the U.S.), while retirement was positively related to 
depression in all countries. Generally the coefficients in the last two columns of Table 8 have 
opposite signs. For instance, unemployment increases the likelihood of depression, while it 
reduces life satisfaction. Note however that these effects are mitigated very substantially in the 
case of a high unemployment replacement rate. Being married, having a higher education, having 
more wealth, all increase life satisfaction and reduce the likelihood of depression. On the other 
hand, having a major health condition or experiencing difficulties with activities of daily living 
reduce life satisfaction and increase the likelihood of depression. 
Notably, household income does not appear to have an appreciable effect on either 
depression or life satisfaction, once we control for all the other explanatory variables. This is also 
in marked contrast with the raw correlations relations reported in Table 4.  
5. Simulations 
To obtain a better understanding of the quantitative importance of the estimation results 
we use the estimated system to simulate the effects of some counterfactual policies. To have a 
valid benchmark to compare the simulations with, we first simulate outcomes for the dependent 
variables within sample and compare with the values observed in the data. The results of this 
exercise are presented in Table 9. 
The second simulation investigates the effect of setting pension replacement rates to 
100% in all countries. The results of this simulation are presented in Table 10 
In contrast the third simulation investigates the effect of setting pension replacement rates 
to 40% in all countries. The results of this simulation are presented in Table 11 
The fourth and final simulation considers the effect of raising early retirement ages to 67 
and full retirement ages to 70. Results are given in Table 12.   
Table 9 shows that the model does a reasonable job of reproducing sample statistics, with 
the exception of log-income, which seems to be systematically over-predicted. 
The simulations in Tables 10 and 11 show only small effects of changes in replacement 
rates. In view of the small estimates of the coefficient estimates of the replacement variables this 
is not surprising. Incomes, which are directly affected by replacement rates, show most 
sensitivity to the level of replacement rates: high replacement rates lead to high incomes and low 
replacement rates lead to low incomes.  
Table 9:  Predicted and Observed Outcome Variables 
Retirement 
predicted 
Retirement 
observed 
Log-
income 
predicted 
Log-
income, 
observed 
Depression 
predicted 
Depression 
observed 
Life 
Satisfaction 
predicted 
Life 
Satisfaction 
observed 
Country 
Austria 0.82 0.82 10.48 10.08 0.19 0.19 4.11 4.13 
Observations 3365 3365 3365 3365 3337 3337 1839 1839
Belgium 0.72 0.72 10.65 10.16 0.25 0.24 4.11 4.12 
Observations 8066 8066 8066 8066 8046 8046 4838 4838 
Denmark 0.59 0.59 11.05 11.78 0.14 0.15 4.50 4.48 
Observations 5257 5257 5257 5257 5225 5225 3857 3857 
France 0.70 0.70 10.64 10.23 0.32 0.32 3.91 3.92 
Observations 7010 7010 7010 7010 6908 6908 4244 4244 
Germany 0.66 0.67 10.59 10.2 0.19 0.19 4.08 4.09 
Observations 6170 6170 6170 6170 6149 6149 3529 3529 
Greece 0.66  0.66 10.89 9.62 0.20 0.19 3.79 3.81 
Observations 4395 4395 4395 4395 4395 4395 2400 2400 
Italy 0.80 0.80 10.72 9.85 0.32 0.31 3.93 3.96 
Observations 6088 6088 6088 6088 6055 6055 4161 4161 
Netherlands 0.68 0.68 10.88 10.33 0.18 0.17 4.20 4.20 
Observations 6522 6522 6522 6522 6501 6501 4007 4007 
Spain 0.75 0.75 10.63 9.54 0.33 0.32 3.94 3.97 
Observations 4587 4587 4587 4587 4537 4537 2940 2940 
Sweden 0.63 0.63 10.78 11.97 0.16 0.17 4.40 4.38 
Observations 6784 6784 6784 6784 6762 6762 4080 4080 
Switzerland 0.59 0.59 10.8 11.07 0.16 0.16 4.41 4.41 
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3102 3102 2257 2257 
United 
States 0.62 0.62 10.33 10.62 0.13 0.13 3.92 3.92 
Observations 59423 59423 59423 59423 55237 55237 25509 25509 
Total 0.66 0.65 10.54 10.54 0.18 0.18 4.05 4.05 
Observations 120775 120775 120775 120775 116254 116254 63661 63661 
Table 10: Simulated outcomes with 100% replacement rates 
Retirement 
simulated 
Retirement 
predicted 
log-income   
simulated 
log-income, 
predicted 
Depression 
simulated 
Depression 
predicted 
Life 
Satisfaction 
simulated 
Life 
Satisfaction 
predicted 
Country 
Austria 0.81 0.82 10.56 10.48 0.20 0.19 4.11 4.11 
Belgium 0.71 0.72 10.87 10.65 0.25 0.25 4.11 4.11 
Denmark 0.58 0.59 11.15 11.05 0.15 0.14 4.49 4.50 
France 0.68 0.70 10.85 10.64 0.33 0.32 3.9 3.91 
Germany 0.65 0.66 10.79 10.59 0.19 0.19 4.07 4.08 
Greece 0.67 0.66 10.86 10.89 0.20 0.20 3.79 3.79 
Italy 0.79 0.80 10.84 10.72 0.32 0.32 3.92 3.93 
Netherlands 0.68 0.68 10.91 10.88 0.18 0.18 4.20 4.20 
Spain 0.75 0.75 10.74 10.63 0.33 0.33 3.94 3.94 
Sweden 0.62 0.63 10.98 10.78 0.16 0.16 4.39 4.40 
Switzerland 0.58 0.59 10.97 10.8 0.16 0.16 4.40 4.41 
United States 0.60 0.62 10.60 10.33 0.13 0.13 3.91 3.92 
Total 0.64 0.66 10.74 10.54 0.18 0.18 4.04 4.05 
 
  
Table 11: Simulated outcomes with 40% replacement rates 
Retirement 
simulated 
Retirement 
predicted 
 log-
income   
simulated 
 log-
income 
predicted 
Depression 
simulated 
Depression 
predicted 
Life 
Satisfaction 
simulated 
Life  
Satisfaction 
predicted 
Country 
Austria 0.84 0.82 10.13 10.48 0.19 0.19 4.12 4.11 
Belgium 0.73 0.72 10.50 10.65 0.25 0.25 4.12 4.11 
Denmark 0.60 0.59 10.84 11.05 0.14 0.14 4.50 4.50 
France 0.71 0.70 10.48 10.64 0.32 0.32 3.91 3.91 
Germany 0.67 0.66 10.45 10.59 0.18 0.19 4.08 4.08 
Greece 0.69 0.66 10.51 10.89 0.19 0.20 3.80 3.79 
Italy 0.82 0.80 10.43 10.72 0.31 0.32 3.93 3.93 
Netherlands 0.69 0.68 10.56 10.88 0.17 0.18 4.20 4.20 
Spain 0.77 0.75 10.34 10.63 0.33 0.33 3.95 3.94 
Sweden 0.64 0.63 10.66 10.78 0.16 0.16 4.40 4.40 
Switzerland 0.60 0.59 10.67 10.80 0.16 0.16 4.41 4.41 
United 
States 0.62 0.62 10.28 10.33 0.12 0.13 3.92 3.92 
Total 0.66 0.66 10.4 10.54 0.18 0.18 4.05 4.05 
 
Table 12 shows the effects of increasing full and early retirement ages. The effects of 
changing eligibility ages on retirement is considerably larger than the effects of changing 
replacement rates. As one would expect, the effects are largest in the countries where currently 
eligibility ages are low, such as Austria, France, and Italy. To obtain more insight in the 
incidence of the effects, we break down the results by age in Tables 13-17. For each country, the 
first row presents the simulated counterfactuals, while the second row presents the predicted in-
sample values. The effects on retirement are large in the age range 55-69 in countries like 
Austria, Belgium, and France. In the remaining countries the effects show up at somewhat later 
ages. As one would expect, the effects on income are most noticeable in these same age ranges, 
but now the size of the effect also depends on replacement rates. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, the effect is quite modest. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Simulated outcomes: Full Retirement Age is 79; Early Retirement age is 67 
Retirement 
simulated 
Retirement 
predicted 
 log-
income   
simulated 
log-
income 
predicted 
Depression 
simulated 
Depression 
predicted 
Life 
Satisfaction 
simulated 
Life 
Satisfaction 
predicted 
Country 
Austria 0.75 0.82 10.50 10.48 0.20 0.19 4.10 4.11 
Belgium 0.68 0.72 10.66 10.65 0.25 0.25 4.10 4.11 
Denmark 0.56 0.59 11.06 11.05 0.15 0.14 4.49 4.50 
France 0.62 0.70 10.67 10.64 0.33 0.32 3.89 3.91 
Germany 0.62 0.66 10.61 10.59 0.19 0.19 4.07 4.08 
Greece 0.62 0.66 10.90 10.89 0.20 0.20 3.78 3.79 
Italy 0.73 0.80 10.74 10.72 0.32 0.32 3.91 3.93 
Netherlands 0.66 0.68 10.89 10.88 0.18 0.18 4.19 4.20 
Spain 0.71 0.75 10.65 10.63 0.33 0.33 3.93 3.94 
Sweden 0.58 0.63 10.8 10.78 0.17 0.16 4.39 4.40 
Switzerland 0.56 0.59 10.82 10.8 0.16 0.16 4.40 4.41 
United States 0.58 0.62 10.35 10.33 0.13 0.13 3.92 3.92 
Total 0.61 0.66 10.56 10.54 0.18 0.18 4.04 4.05 
 
  
Table 13: Simulated retirement by age 
<=54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 >=75 Total Country 
Austria Simulated 0.27 0.49 0.65 0.78 1.03 1.08 0.75 
Predicted 0.27 0.54 0.8 0.95 1.03 1.08 0.82 
Belgium Simulated 0.27 0.43 0.57 0.75 1.01 1.07 0.68 
Predicted 0.27 0.43 0.67 0.92 1.01 1.07 0.72 
Denmark Simulated 0.14 0.30 0.46 0.65 0.92 0.98 0.56 
Predicted 0.14 0.30 0.46 0.82 0.92 0.98 0.59 
France Simulated 0.19 0.36 0.51 0.69 0.94 1.01 0.62 
Predicted 0.19 0.44 0.74 0.86 0.94 1.01 0.70 
Germany Simulated 0.22 0.37 0.52 0.70 0.95 1.01 0.62 
Predicted 0.22 0.37 0.56 0.87 0.95 1.01 0.66 
Greece Simulated 0.17 0.38 0.59 0.76 1.00 1.06 0.62 
Predicted 0.17 0.40 0.70 0.92 1.00 1.06 0.66 
Italy Simulated 0.25 0.45 0.63 0.77 1.02 1.07 0.73 
Predicted 0.25 0.49 0.78 0.94 1.02 1.07 0.80 
Netherlands Simulated 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.77 1.04 1.09 0.66 
Predicted 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.94 1.04 1.09 0.68 
Spain Simulated 0.21 0.39 0.60 0.75 0.99 1.05 0.71 
Predicted 0.21 0.39 0.69 0.92 0.99 1.05 0.75 
Sweden Simulated 0.13 0.29 0.43 0.61 0.87 0.93 0.58 
Predicted 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.78 0.87 0.93 0.63 
Switzerland Simulated 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.62 0.87 0.93 0.56 
Predicted 0.13 0.29 0.50 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.59 
United States Simulated 0.08 0.23 0.37 0.55 0.81 0.89 0.58 
Predicted 0.08 0.23 0.44 0.7 0.81 0.89 0.62 
Total Simulated 0.16 0.31 0.46 0.63 0.88 0.94 0.61 
Predicted 0.16 0.32 0.55 0.79 0.88 0.94 0.66 
Table 14: Simulated Log-income by Age 
<=54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 >=75 Total Country  
Austria Simulated 11.95 11.44 10.93 10.43 9.88 9.04 10.50 
Predicted 11.95 11.43 10.89 10.39 9.88 9.04 10.48 
Belgium Simulated 12.08 11.57 11.06 10.45 9.87 9.09 10.66 
Predicted 12.08 11.57 11.01 10.38 9.87 9.09 10.65 
Denmark Simulated 12.48 11.91 11.41 10.85 10.22 9.38 11.06 
Predicted 12.48 11.91 11.41 10.8 10.22 9.38 11.05 
France Simulated 12.09 11.60 11.08 10.49 9.91 9.11 10.67 
Predicted 12.09 11.56 10.99 10.42 9.91 9.11 10.64 
Germany Simulated 11.93 11.52 10.94 10.37 9.86 9.02 10.61 
Predicted 11.93 11.52 10.93 10.30 9.86 9.02 10.59 
Greece Simulated 12.13 11.64 11.09 10.52 10.06 9.28 10.9 
Predicted 12.13 11.64 11.08 10.50 10.06 9.28 10.89 
Italy Simulated 12.15 11.64 11.12 10.60 10.08 9.38 10.74 
Predicted 12.15 11.62 11.07 10.55 10.08 9.38 10.72 
Netherlands Simulated 12.14 11.67 11.17 10.61 10.05 9.26 10.89 
Predicted 12.14 11.67 11.17 10.58 10.05 9.26 10.88 
Spain Simulated 12.13 11.67 11.11 10.61 10.07 9.35 10.65 
Predicted 12.13 11.67 11.08 10.57 10.07 9.35 10.63 
Sweden Simulated 12.37 11.86 11.36 10.78 10.15 9.27 10.80 
Predicted 12.37 11.86 11.32 10.71 10.15 9.27 10.78 
Switzerland Simulated 12.22 11.75 11.24 10.67 10.06 9.24 10.82 
Predicted 12.22 11.75 11.22 10.6 10.06 9.24 10.80 
United States Simulated 12.05 11.59 11.05 10.47 9.91 9.10 10.35 
Predicted 12.05 11.59 11.01 10.39 9.91 9.10 10.33 
Total Simulated 12.12 11.63 11.10 10.52 9.96 9.15 10.56 
Predicted 12.12 11.63 11.07 10.45 9.96 9.15 10.54 
 
  
  
The effect on depression is generally modest. We note a slight uptick in France and Italy 
in the age group 60-64. Similarly the effect on life satisfaction is most visible in the 60-69 age 
range in France and Italy. The effects are most visible in the U.S. in the age range 65-60. 
Table 15: Simulated Depression Rates by Age 
 <=54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 >=75 Total Country 
Austria Simulated 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.20 
Predicted 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.19 
Belgium Simulated 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.25 
Predicted 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.25 
Denmark Simulated 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.15 
Predicted 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.14 
France Simulated 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.33 
Predicted 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.32 
Germany Simulated 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.19 
Predicted 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.19 
Greece Simulated 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.20 
Predicted 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.20 
Italy Simulated 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.32 
Predicted 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.32 
Netherlands Simulated 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.18 
Predicted 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.18 
Spain Simulated 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.33 
Predicted 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.33 
Sweden Simulated 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.17 
Predicted 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.16 
Switzerland Simulated 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Predicted 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 
United States Simulated 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 
Predicted 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 
Total Simulated 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 
Predicted 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.18 
  
 
Table 16: Simulated Life Satisfaction by Age 
 <=54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 >=75 Total  Country 
 Austria Simulated 4.14 4.11 4.10 4.11 4.13 4.05 4.10 
Predicted 4.14 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.13 4.05 4.11 
 Belgium Simulated 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.09 4.13 4.10 4.10 
Predicted 4.10 4.10 4.12 4.12 4.13 4.10 4.11 
 Denmark Simulated 4.50 4.49 4.49 4.50 4.51 4.48 4.49 
Predicted 4.50 4.49 4.49 4.53 4.51 4.48 4.50 
 France Simulated 3.91 3.91 3.89 3.88 3.92 3.87 3.89 
Predicted 3.91 3.93 3.93 3.91 3.92 3.87 3.91 
 Germany Simulated 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.07 4.13 4.06 4.07 
Predicted 4.06 4.06 4.07 4.10 4.13 4.06 4.08 
 Greece Simulated 3.81 3.80 3.79 3.75 3.77 3.73 3.78 
Predicted 3.81 3.80 3.81 3.78 3.77 3.73 3.79 
 Italy Simulated 3.96 3.94 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.89 3.91 
Predicted 3.96 3.95 3.94 3.94 3.91 3.89 3.93 
 Netherlands Simulated 4.18 4.19 4.19 4.20 4.20 4.18 4.19 
Predicted 4.18 4.19 4.19 4.23 4.20 4.18 4.2 
 Spain Simulated 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.93 3.95 3.95 3.93 
Predicted 3.92 3.92 3.93 3.96 3.95 3.95 3.94 
 Sweden Simulated 4.41 4.41 4.40 4.40 4.39 4.35 4.39 
Predicted 4.41 4.41 4.42 4.43 4.39 4.35 4.40 
 Switzerland Simulated 4.39 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.42 4.40 4.40 
Predicted 4.39 4.40 4.41 4.43 4.42 4.40 4.41 
 United States Simulated 3.84 3.85 3.88 3.91 3.95 3.95 3.92 
Predicted 3.84 3.85 3.89 3.94 3.95 3.95 3.92 
 Total Simulated 4.07 4.03 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.03 4.04 
Predicted 4.07 4.03 4.06 4.06 4.04 4.03 4.05 
 
 6. Concluding Remarks 
We have estimated a simultaneous system of equations explaining the joint determination 
of retirement, income, depression, and life satisfaction. The system accounts for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, by including fixed effects. Statistical tests show that omitting these 
would lead to serious misspecification. To identify causal effects we have used variation in 
institutions across countries that influence retirement decisions and household incomes. Our 
main findings are that depressive symptoms are negatively related to retirement. In other words 
retirement reduces the probability of depression. At the same time, life satisfaction is positively 
related to retirement. Interestingly, income does not appear to play much of a role in the 
determination of depression or life satisfaction, once other factors are accounted for. This 
contrasts with the correlations in the raw data, which suggested that a higher income leads to 
higher life satisfaction and to fewer depressive symptoms. 
As one would expect, household wealth, being married, and educational attainment, are 
all positively related to life satisfaction and reduce the probability of depression. Health 
conditions and difficulties with activities of daily living increase the probability of depression 
and reduce life satisfaction. 
There is a rather long list of issues that merit further research. Two of these are 
methodological. Due to data limitations we have estimated static models. Once the 2012 wave of 
SHARE is available we should be able to estimate a dynamic model. Secondly, we have used 
linear probability models for the determination of retirement and of depression. Although, there 
is a fair amount of evidence that in practice it may not make a whole lot of difference, preferably 
these equations should be formulated in a limited dependent variable form, such as Probit.  
On the substantive side, various improvements come to mind. One of these is related to 
data. Although the data on depression and on life satisfaction show some overlap, they are far 
from identical. Clearly the analysis could be more powerful if identical measures were available 
in both datasets. A second improvement can come from a more fine grained analysis of 
retirement incentives. We have used OECD net replacement rates for median earners at full 
retirement. An obvious next step is to consider how these replacement rates are actuarially 
adjusted for earlier retirement ages. A third improvement we will investigate concerns the 
specification of the relationship between retirement and depression or life satisfaction. Rather 
than retirement status as an explanatory variable, we will consider specifications that have time 
since retirement on the right hand side to accommodate adaptation processes that may take time 
to play out after retirement. 
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